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ABSTRACT 
Marshall was the great synthesiser of neoclassical economics. Yet with his qualified 
assumption of self-interest, his emphasis on variation in economic evolution, and his cautious 
attitude to the use of mathematics, Marshall differs fundamentally from other leading 
neoclassical contemporaries. Metaphors inspire more specific analogies and ontological 
assumptions, and Marshall used the guiding metaphor of Spencerian evolution. But 
unfortunately the further development of a Marshallian evolutionary approach was 
undermined in part by theoretical problems within Spencer’s theory. Yet some things can be 
salvaged from the Marshallian evolutionary vision. They may even be placed in a more viable 
Darwinian framework.  
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Come back Marshall, all is forgiven? 
Complexity, evolution, mathematics and Marshallian exceptionalism 
Geoffrey M. Hodgson 
Especially after the Great Crash of 2008, many worries about the state of modern economics 
have surfaced.1 Some academic observers claim that economics is now overly dominated by 
mathematical technique rather than real substance: the discipline is creating ‘idiot savants’ 
(Krueger 1991) and has become ‘sick’ (Blaug 1997). But there are differences of opinion on 
the ultimate roots of the sickness (Hodgson 2011).  
Some scholars trace the malady in modern economics to the ‘marginal revolution’ and rise 
of neoclassical economics from the 1870s (Milonakis and Fine 2009, Fine and Milonakis 
2009). In such accounts, Alfred Marshall is lumped together with William Stanley Jevons, 
Carl Menger, Léon Walras and others. Marshall – the great synthesiser of neoclassical theory 
– can even be singled out for special blame for his leading and influential role.  
Several historians of economics have persuasively countered the notion of a ‘marginal 
revolution’ (Ekelund and Hébert 2002), arguing that instead it was a long, drawn out process 
starting well before 1870 and continuing at least until 1890. The terms ‘marginal revolution’ 
or ‘marginalist revolution’ are at best misleading, and they did not appear in leading journals 
until after the Second World War.2 Others have emphasised the theoretical differences 
between Jevons, Menger and Walras (Jaffé 1976). While persuasive, these are not the 
arguments that I wish to pursue here.  
If we consider in detail the growth and role of mathematics in economics, from the 
pioneering work of Augustin Cournot (1838) through the energetic promotions of Francis 
Edgeworth (1881), Irving Fisher (1892) and many others until the present day, one must be 
amazed by Marshall’s early, isolated and repeated worries about this development. By 
contrast, if we simply lump all these authors together as ‘neoclassicals’ or ‘marginalists’ then 
we overlook such nuances and differences of great contemporary relevance.  
I share the view – promoted by a number of historians and philosophers of science – that 
metaphors and analogies play a crucial role in scientific development.3 In his pioneering study 
of metaphor and analogy in science, Max Black (1962, p. 237) concluded: ‘Metaphorical 
                                                 
1 The author thanks John Davis, Ben Fine, Richard Nelson, anonymous referees and several others for comments 
on an earlier draft of this essay. If one is to forgive Marshall, it would not extend to his endorsement of eugenics, 
for example, which he shared with many contemporaries, including leading economists Irving Fisher and John 
Maynard Keynes.  
2 The first known appearance of the terms ‘marginal revolution’ or ‘marginalist revolution’ is Myint (1946).  
3 See Black (1962), Hesse (1966), Johnson (1981), Way (1991), Mirowski (1994), Maasen et al. (1995), Keller 
(2002).  
 - 2 - 
thought is a distinctive mode of achieving insight, not to be construed as an ornamental 
substitute for plain thought.’ Metaphors sometimes sustain and feed into meta-theories, which 
in turn play the role of organising enquiry and directing auxiliary theories, as with Darwin’s 
over-arching principles of evolution in biology, or the notion of optimising agents in 
mainstream economics. Metaphors can also inspire more specific analogies and ontological 
assumptions. Arguably, adequate theories of complex systems must unavoidably be 
multileveled, combining general and particularistic theoretical frames (Hodgson 2001).  
My argument is that the differences between Marshall and his other ‘neoclassical’ 
contemporaries – including differences on the proper role of mathematics in economics – can 
be traced in part to fundamentally different organising metaphors, meta-theories, analogies 
and ontological assumptions. While his neoclassical contemporaries embraced metaphors and 
formalisms from physics (Mirowski 1989), at this meta-theoretical level Marshall was 
primarily influenced by the evolutionary theory of Herbert Spencer. The influence of Spencer 
on Marshall is noted by several Marshallian scholars (Moss 1990, Thomas 1991, 
Groenewegen 1995, Raffaelli 2003, Cook 2009) but is still often underestimated, partly 
because the role of metaphor and organising meta-theory are insufficiently appreciated, and 
partly because few people read or understand Spencer any more.4 The secondary role of his 
Spencerian vision in limiting the use of mathematics is also under-explored.  Furthermore, 
once the organising role of a meta-theory is taken on board, the question is raised of what 
could replace the now-obsolete role of Spencerian evolution in the development of a post-
Marshallian economic theory.  
This essay is organised as follows. The first section considers the appropriation of 
metaphors and the enthusiasm for mathematics by early neoclassical writers. The second 
section contrasts Marshall’s much more cautious attitude to the deployment of mathematics in 
economics. The third section outlines Spencer’s thought. The fourth section considers the 
influence of Spencer on Marshall, and stresses the role of Spencerian meta-theory in guiding 
Marshall’s thought, including his attitude to mathematics. The fifth section draws 
conclusions, some of which concern the agenda for economics today.  
1. Mathematics and physics in early neoclassical economics 
Cournot (1838) laid down some of the foundations of the marginalist or neoclassical approach 
in economic theory. He introduced the notions of function and probability into economic 
analysis and he was the first to express and illustrate supply and demand curves as functions 
of price. Irving Fisher (1898, p. 119) noted with regret that Cournot’s work was ‘passed over 
in silence, if not contempt’.  
The rise of the concept of marginal utility signalled a further opportunity for much greater 
use of mathematics in general and calculus in particular. Although it was not directly 
measurable, utility seemed an ideal candidate for uni-dimensional quantification.5 Albeit with 
contrasting modes of application, this idea is manifest in the seminal marginalist treatises of 
                                                 
4 Spencer’s output is voluminous. But much can be gained by reading Spencer (1890). The differences between 
Spencer’s and Darwin’s theories of evolution must be clearly understood (Hodgson 1993b, 2004a).  
5 See Fisher (1892). Problems within this vision were revealed later, regarding interpersonal comparisons of 
utility and the adoption by some of ordinal rather than cardinal measures.  
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Jevons (1871), Menger (1871) and Walras (1874). But their approaches are quite different 
(Jaffé 1976). Menger was the founder of the Austrian school and they often regarded 
mathematical models as of limited use.  
In contrast, for Jevons (1871, pp. 50, 52, 70), economics ‘must be pervaded by … the 
tracing out of the mechanics of self-interest and utility.’ He believed that ‘all economic 
writers must be mathematical so far as they are scientific at all.’ In part he justified this stance 
on the grounds that economics ‘deals in quantities’, particularly in the form of prices.6 Jevons 
forgot that much of mathematics is not about quantities. His complementary presumption of 
utility as the sole goal of human behaviour also prompted a utilitarian analysis that eclipsed 
other psychological notions and any lingering Smithian ‘moral sentiments’. 
Francis Edgeworth pioneered a similar line, embracing both Benthamism and mathematics. 
Defending the idea that individuals maximize their own utility or pleasure, in his 
Mathematical Psychics Edgeworth (1881, p. 15) argued that ‘the conception of Man as a 
pleasure machine may justify and facilitate the employment of mechanical terms and 
Mathematical reasoning in social science.’  
Further evidence for this connection comes from the work of the American neoclassical 
economist Irving Fisher. Originally trained as a mathematical physicist, Fisher was one of the 
earliest and most forceful evangelists for mathematics in economics. Fisher (1892, p. 85) 
drew up a table of ‘mechanical analogies’ where a ‘particle’ in mechanics ‘corresponds to’ an 
‘individual’ in economics, ‘Space’ ‘corresponds to’ ‘Commodity’, ‘Force’ to ‘Marginal utility 
or disutility’, ‘Work’ to ‘Disutility’ and ‘Energy’ to ‘Utility’. Vilfredo Pareto (1897, p. 490) 
justified the appeal to mechanics in similar terms: 
Rational mechanics gives us a first approximation to the theory of the equilibrium and of 
the movements of bodies. ... Pure economics has no better way of expressing the concrete 
economic phenomenon than rational mechanics has for representing the concrete 
mechanical one. It is at this point that there is a place for mathematics. ... It therefore 
appears quite legitimate to appeal also to mathematics for assistance in the solution of the 
economic problem. 
The mention by Jevons, Edgeworth, Fisher and Pareto of ‘mechanics’ was no accidental 
turn of phrase. As with Walras (1874), the search for usable mathematical techniques had 
quickly gravitated towards physics. As Philip Mirowski (1989) demonstrates, a particular kind 
of late nineteenth-century physics (known as energetics) provided specific formalisms 
(especially those involving calculus) that guided the general approach to modelling. This 
approach enshrined a preoccupation with equilibria and elevated the supreme goal of 
prediction. Inspired by these metaphors, equipped with some basic mechanical analogies, 
brimming with admiration for the powers of mathematical technique, and driven by 
expectations of greater forecasting ability, a number of leading neoclassical economists 
launched their campaign for formalism and precision into the twentieth century.  
The persistence of what Mirowski (1989) describes as ‘physics envy’ among economists 
has remained a major impulse to extend the scope of mathematics in their subject. But much 
theory in the natural sciences is not articulated mathematically. Furthermore, when some 
                                                 
6 Mirowski (2012) points to the severe difficulties in this and other presumptions of an underlying quantitative 
ontology. Prices depend on suppositions of invariance that are contingent rather than historically universal. The 
idea of using the presumed quantitative nature of the object of investigation as justification for the prevalent use 
of mathematics is thus undermined.  
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physicists have cast their eye on economics they have complained about the unfalsifiability or 
lack of empirical grounding for its assumptions (e.g. Chatterjee and Chakrabati 2007, pp. 250 
ff.). 
2. Marshall and mathematics 
But while the neoclassical approach promoted a great deal of mathematical enterprise, the role 
of mathematics in economics long remained a matter of debate, even within the neoclassical 
camp. The key witness here is Marshall.  
In methodological terms, Marshall tried to steer a middle course between a priorism and 
empiricism. In multiple editions of his Principles, Marshall (1920, p. 22) quoted and endorsed 
Gustav Schmoller’s statement that: ‘Induction and deduction are both needed for scientific 
thought as the left foot and the right foot are both needed for walking.’7 
His Principles contain much empirical material. His Industry and Trade (Marshall 1919) is 
empirically an even richer account. Generally he combined both theory and fact, arguing that 
‘facts by themselves are silent’ (Marshall 1885, p. 166) but also insisting that theory must face 
the facts. He was highly sceptical of naïve empiricism, on the one hand, and of excessive 
formalism, on the other. He saw economic theory as an essential precondition of empirical 
enquiry, rather than something that emerged automatically from the gathering of data. But he 
also saw limits to highly general ‘pure theory’ of the type found in the works of Ricardo and 
Jevons. Instead, theory had to be related to empirical material. Hence on 12 October 1899 
Marshall wrote to William A. S. Hewins, the first Director of the London School of 
Economics, concerning the economics curriculum at the School: 
The fact is I am the dull mean man, who holds Economics to be an organic whole, and 
has little respect for pure theory (otherwise than as a branch of mathematics or the science 
of numbers), as for that crude collection and interpretation of facts without the aid of high 
analysis which sometimes claims to be part of economic history. (Whitaker, 1996, vol. 2, 
p. 256) 
Marshall again wrote to Hewins on 29 May 1900: 
Much of ‘pure theory’ seems to me to be elegant toying: I habitually describe my own 
pure theory of international trade as a ‘toy’. I understand economic science to be the 
application of powerful analytical methods to unravelling the actions of economic and 
social causes, to assigning each its part, to tracing mutual interactions and modifications; 
and above all to laying bare the hidden causas causantes. (Whitaker, 1996, vol. 2, p. 280) 
Marshall thus emphasised the goal for the economist of understanding underlying causes. 
Marshall wrote to Francis Edgeworth on 28 August 1902. Again he stressed that the role of 
theory was both essential and limited:  
In my view ‘Theory’ is essential. … But I conceive no more calamitous notion than that 
abstract, or general, or ‘theoretical’ economics was economics ‘proper.’ It seems to me an 
essential but a very small part of economics proper: and by itself sometimes even – well, 
not a very good occupation of time. (Whitaker, 1996, vol. 2, p. 393) 
                                                 
7 Schmoller was a leading member of the German historical school. Hodgson (2001, 2005a, 2005b) argues that 
the idea that Marshall was a generally hostile to the historical school is a myth.  
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For Marshall, mathematical tools were of great use in the task of constructing and developing 
a theory, but they were useful primarily as means to clarify and render consistent the 
argument. Mathematics was not theory as such. Hence on 27 February 1906 Marshall gave 
the following advice concerning the use of mathematics a letter to Arthur Bowley: 
(1) Use mathematics as shorthand language, rather than as an engine of inquiry. (2) Keep 
to them till you have done. (3) Translate into English. (4) Then illustrate by examples that 
are important in real life (5) Burn the mathematics. (6) If you can’t succeed in 4, burn 3. 
This I do often. (Whitaker 1996, vol. 3, p. 130). 
Cambridge colleague and former student Arthur Pigou (1925, p. 84) reminisced about 
Marshall:  
Though a skilled mathematician, he used mathematics sparingly. He saw that excessive 
reliance on this instrument might lead us astray in pursuit of intellectual toys, imaginary 
problems not conforming to the conditions of real life: and further, might distort our sense 
of proportion by causing us to neglect factors that could not easily be worked up in the 
mathematical machine.  
These sentiments are radically different from those that prevail in economics today.8 
Marshall’s attitude to mathematics in the years around 1900 serves as a benchmark for much 
of the discipline at that time, alongside the strong and growing mathematical enthusiasm of a 
minority of academic economists. But by the end of the twentieth century, mathematics had 
indeed become the principal ‘engine of enquiry’ driving the discipline, rather than a 
subservient tool of discursive theoretical development. Many published models may be 
accused of neglecting ‘factors that could not easily be worked up in the mathematical 
machine’.  
Marshall’s reasons for his mathematical caution are not further elaborated by Pigou, but we 
may take the cue from the former student that his teacher emphasised the gap between 
mathematical models and ‘the conditions of real life’ and was concerned a relatively 
excessive concern with technical formalism may cause us ‘to neglect factors that could not 
easily be worked up in the mathematical machine.’ It is possible that Marshall developed this 
cautious position towards formalisation in Cambridge in the 1860s when he concentrated on 
the study of mathematics and philosophy. But other factors also came into play. When he 
turned to economics in the 1870s he developed a conception of economic life emphasising 
diversity, complexity and evolution to a much greater degree than other neoclassical 
contemporaries. He saw the mathematics of his era as inadequate in the face of complex and 
varied reality, and warned of the danger of (relatively simplified) formulae being the ‘engine 
of enquiry’, rather than the real kaleidic world.  
Marshall’s vision of a varied, complex and evolving world was partly inspired by the then-
influential discourse of Spencerian evolution. The complex and evolutionary character of 
economic systems caused him to invocate Spencerian biology (Moss 1990, Thomas 1991, 
Hodgson 1993a, 1993b, Raffaelli 2003, Cook 2009). His adoption of this meta-theory, rather 
                                                 
8 Brems (1975) briefly criticizes Marshall’s stance, arguing that mathematics is indispensable and should be used 
as a dominant engine of enquiry. But the former does not imply the latter. Marshall’s cautious attitude to the role 
of mathematics found later expression in the work of his Cambridge student John Maynard Keynes (e.g. 1936, p. 
298). Weintraub (2002) argues that Marshall’s and Keynes’s views became rapidly unrepresentative, even within 
Cambridge. 
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than one drawn directly from mechanics or physics, partially accounts for his much more 
cautious attitude to the use of mathematics in the development of economic theory. 
3. Spencer, complexity and evolution 
In the second half of the nineteenth century, Charles Darwin was rivalled in standing by 
Herbert Spencer (Bowler 1983, 1988). Trained in physics and mathematics, and a brilliant 
polymath and synthesiser, Spencer wrote books on biology and extended evolutionary ideas to 
ethics and social science. Spencer commenced his prodigious output in the 1840s and his 
works reached a high peak of popularity in the period from about 1860 to 1890. He became a 
towering and widely-applauded figure in the world of learning. He was particularly popular in 
the USA, where from 1860 to 1903 over 386,000 of his books were sold (Hofstadter 1959, p. 
34). The writings of Marshall cannot be fully understood without an appreciation of Spencer’s 
thought and influence.9 
It was Spencer, not Darwin, who popularized the term ‘evolution’. Darwin did not 
introduce the word until the sixth edition of the Origin of Species, and then only sparingly. On 
the whole, Darwin preferred phrases like ‘descent with modification’ to ‘evolution’. 
Furthermore, it was Spencer, not Darwin, who invented the slogan ‘survival of the fittest’. It 
was not until 1866, after the first edition of the Origin of Species had appeared that Darwin 
was persuaded by his friend Alfred Russel Wallace to use Spencer’s ‘survival of the fittest’ 
phrase in later editions of that work (Waters 1986, pp. 207-8).  
Both Spencer and Darwin (1859) adopted the Lamarckian notion of the inheritance of 
acquired characters. Darwin allowed for this possibility partly because he was unaware of the 
mechanisms of inheritance, and he also worried whether natural selection was sufficient to 
account for the presumed pace of evolutionary change. By contrast, Spencer placed 
Lamarckian principles at the centre of his theory. This meant not only the adoption of the idea 
of the inheritance of acquired characters, but also Jean Baptiste de Lamarck’s ([1809] 1984) 
law of increasing complexity in evolution.  
Lamarck and Spencer argued that environmental circumstances lead to the differential use 
and disuse of organs (Burkhardt 1977). High levels of use in an environment encourage the 
strengthening and development of the organ, while low levels lead to deterioration and 
eventual disappearance. In addition, characters which are thus developed by use can be 
inherited by offspring. This leads to greater diversity, which becomes inherited. Evolution in 
the Lamarck-Spencer account is thus a process of increasing diversity and complexity.  
While both Spencer and Darwin saw diversity and variety as part of evolution, these 
concepts played different roles in their theories. For Darwin (1859), diversity was the prior 
and essential fuel for the process of natural selection. For him ‘variation was present first, and 
the ordering activity of the environment (“natural selection”) followed afterwards’ (Mayr 
1982, p. 354). Darwin argued that change resulted from a combination of innate variation, 
environmental adaptation and environmental selection. Although Spencer too saw selection at 
                                                 
9 Although Spencer is widely described today as a leading advocate of ‘social Darwinism’, no-one ever 
described him in such terms until the 1930s. Spencer was an anti-militarist and anti-imperialist. The early (and 
extremely rare) uses of the term ‘social Darwinism’ were applied most often to militarists, nationalists and 
imperialists, and less so to pro-market individualists (Hodgson 2004b, 2006). See also Bannister (1979).  
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work, for him diversity was more significant as the teleological result of the evolutionary 
process, rather than its essential starting point. 
Spencer (1888 p. 22) defined evolution as ‘a change from an indefinite, incoherent 
homogeneity, to a definite, coherent heterogeneity through continuous differentiations.’ For 
him, evolution was a law of the universe, necessarily involving progress. This teleological 
definition of evolution portends a universal directional movement from one state 
(homogeneity) to another (heterogeneity). Evolution meant increasing diversity and 
complexity. More complex forms were generally regarded as fitter and more adaptable. 
Spencer’s teleological principles recur in his writings. The first, the ‘change from the 
homogeneous to the heterogeneous, is displayed equally in the progress of civilization as a 
whole, and in the progress of every tribe or nation; and is still going on with increasing 
rapidity’ (Spencer 1890, pp. 342-3). The second concerned a simultaneous tendency towards 
integration: ‘In every more or less separate part of every aggregate, integration has been, or is, 
in progress’ (Spencer 1890, p. 307).  
With his teleological belief in progress, Spencer (1855, p. 492) proposed that ‘life attains 
more and more perfect forms’, and that humans were no exception to this rule. Spencer (1851, 
p. 65) wrote: ‘Progress, therefore, is not an accident, it is a part of nature; all of a piece with 
the development of the embryo or the unfolding of a flower.’ For him, the evolutionary 
process was seen as a beneficent journey from the lower to the higher form of organisation or 
life, and from the inferior to the superior. 
Furthermore, he saw evolution as leading to equilibrium and greater harmony, a process he 
described as ‘equilibriation’. Spencer (1890, p. 524) wrote: ‘the changes which evolution 
presents cannot end until equilibrium is reached, and that equilibrium must at last be reached’. 
Spencer (1890, p. 525) thus wrote of ‘a gradual advance towards harmony between man’s 
mental nature and the conditions of his existence.’ His conception of heterogeneity involves 
integration and excludes antagonism and strife. While for Malthus, Marx and Darwin, 
antagonism could be creative, for Spencer it led to destruction. 
Darwin upheld no such teleological laws. Instead he focused on detailed causal processes at 
the micro level. Furthermore, unlike Spencer, Darwin wrote in a letter of 1859 of ‘the theory 
of Natural Selection, which implies no necessary tendency to progression’ (F. Darwin, 1887, 
vol. 2, p. 210). Darwin (1871, vol. 1, pp. 166-77) also opined: ‘we are apt to look at progress 
as the normal rule in human society; but history refutes this. … We must remember that 
progress is no invariable rule.’ 
Ideas remarkably similar to Spencer’s have frequently recurred well into the twentieth 
century, and often without reference to their precursors. The twentieth century has seen the 
‘unknowing rediscovery of Spencer’ as Jonathan Turner (1985, pp. 7-8) puts it. For example, 
Spencer can be regarded as one of the forerunners of general systems theory (Turner 1985). 
There are also close parallels between Spencer’s ideas and the work of Ilya Prigogine and his 
associates, with their emphasis on ‘increasing complexity’ and the move from the 
undifferentiated to the differentiated state in evolving systems (Corning 1983, pp. 73-5).  
Unlike Spencer’s system, Darwin’s theory lacked general ‘laws’ of evolution to charm his 
Victorian audience. The hidden power of Darwin’s theory was its reliance on detailed causal 
explanation rather than ultimately mystical teleological principles. As Claes Andersson (2008, 
p. 232) puts it: ‘the extraordinary explanatory force of Darwinism is due to its ability to 
explain purpose without assuming purpose a priori.’  
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Spencer could not explain the causal powers behind his evolutionary laws. As Robert M. 
Young (1969, p. 135) argued: ‘The main feature of Spencer’s explanation was not population 
pressure but progress itself.’ His laws lacked justification. He was thus forced to fall back on 
to the mystical notion of a universal and unknowable motive force, an ‘inaccessible Ultimate 
Cause’ (Wiltshire 1978, p. 207), working generally in the direction of ‘progress’. 
Spencer’s evolutionary theory evoked aspects of the physics of his time, including the law 
of the conservation of energy (Capek 1961, p. 102, La Vergata 1995). Like neoclassical 
economists he was also influenced by energetics. Spencer shifted biology away from the 
population thinking established by Darwin, translating it back ‘into the language of physics’ 
(Bannister 1979, p. 19). Charles Sanders Peirce (1923, pp. 162-3; 1935, pp. 15-16) saw a 
profound inconsistency in Spencer’s ideas in his flawed attempt to combine the principle of 
the conservation of energy with a notion of evolution.  
This created an inner tension in Spencer’s work. On the one hand, he emphasised evolution 
and complexity, and prefigured much modern thinking in this area. On the other hand he 
embraced mechanical metaphors and concepts such as equilibrium that were being 
enthusiastically adopted by mainstream neoclassical economists. He faced both ways. A very 
similar dilemma is found in the works of Marshall, who keenly adopted both the mechanistic 
and variety-generating features of Spencer’s system.  
4. Marshall and Spencer 
Marshall saw the limitations of mechanical reasoning, and turned to biology in his search for 
inspiration and metaphor. However, the science was young and the mechanisms of evolution 
were not fully understood. At the time, many biologists questioned the Darwinian approach. 
There was an alternative and bolder synthesis on offer. For Marshall, as for many of his 
contemporaries, ‘the writings of Herbert Spencer were even more significant than those of 
Darwin’ (Thomas 1991, p. 3). While Darwin was widely applauded, the details of his 
evolutionary theory were under-appreciated (Bowler 1983, 1988). Laurence Moss (1990) 
makes a strong but supportable claim that Marshall, like so many others, did not take on board 
key features of Darwin’s theory. His energies were directed more towards Spencer, whose 
writings remained enormously influential until the 1890s. After Spencer died in 1903, 
Marshall recollected the great influence of the evolutionist in a glowing tribute in the Daily 
Chronicle. He recollected how a saying of Spencer  
sent the blood rushing through the veins of those who a generation ago looked eagerly for 
each volume of his as it issued from the press. There is probably no one who gave as 
strong a stimulus to the thoughts of the younger Cambridge graduates thirty or forty years 
ago as he. He opened a new world of promise (Marshall 1904, in Pigou 1925, p. 507).  
Keynes (1924, p. 13) quoted Mary Marshall’s account of how her husband would read 
volumes of Spencer on their walking holidays in the Alps. Marshall added extensive marginal 
annotations to successive volumes of Spencer’s works (Laurent 2000). In the Preface to the 
first edition of the Principles Marshall ([1890] 1920, p. 6) singled out the writings of Spencer 
and Hegel above all others, because they had ‘affected more than any other the substance of 
the views expressed in the present book.’  
Yet the influence of Spencer over Marshall is often underestimated. To date, discussions of 
Marshall’s use of biology in general and Spencerian evolutionism in particular are rare in the 
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literature.10 A search in JSTOR of articles in journals in economics mentioning ‘Alfred 
Marshall’ found that only 2.6% of them also mentioned ‘Herbert Spencer’.11 When articles 
published on or before 1930 were considered using the same criteria the frequency was found 
to be 6.2%. The frequency since 1930 was 2.2%. Appreciation of the Marshall-Spencer 
connection seems to have declined rather than improved. 
Much of Marshall’s Principles concerns equilibrium and economic statics. He planned a 
second volume to deal more fully with dynamics and the elusive element of time (Moss 1990, 
Whitaker 1990). This companion work was to address irreversible changes and organic 
development, drawing its inspiration more from biology than from physics. Some of these 
dynamic issues are addressed in the Principles, but they remain underdeveloped. Although the 
Principles are peppered lightly with biological metaphors, much of the analysis is mechanical, 
addressing equilibrium outcomes, as Marshall himself admitted. 
At the same time Marshall was aware of the tension between an equilibrium framework and 
one involving evolution and increasing variety and complexity. This is apparent, for example, 
in his treatment of increasing returns. It became clear to him that a movement up or down the 
long-run supply curve would in reality be irreversible, unlike a standard mechanical model. 
Marshall’s intellectual honesty and eye on reality was such that he did not assume away 
problems of this kind. He became ever-more convinced that increasing returns was a major 
feature of contemporary capitalism. He was nagged by the problems of increasing returns and 
time irreversibility for the remainder of his life.12  
Another tension is present in his treatment of the ‘representative firm’. Although he 
associates this notion with ‘organic development’, it is essentially a theoretical device to deal 
with variety by entrapping it, rather than by encompassing diversity within a population-based 
theory of dynamic competition and change. This largely heuristic concept deals with the 
varied population of firms by identifying a single set of distinct characteristics which are 
deemed to represent the heterogeneous population, i.e. the industry  as a whole. It is not a 
single firm, or even a typical firm; it is an imaginary firm which exhibits, in microcosm, the 
‘representative’ features of the entire industry. Perceptions of conflict and diversity within 
that domain are thus diminished by this concept.13 
To adopt the terms of Ernst Mayr (1982), the conceptualization of the representative firm in 
Marshall’s work is more an example of Platonic ‘typological essentialism’ than Darwinian 
‘population thinking’, the latter also having implications for evolutionary analysis in the 
social sciences (Sober 1980, Metcalfe 1988). In ‘typological’ thinking species are regarded as 
identifiable in terms of a few distinct characteristics which represent their essence. 
Accordingly, all variations around the ideal type are regarded as accidental aberrations. 
                                                 
10 Exceptions include Reisman (1987), Moss (1990), Niman (1991), Groenewegen (1995), Raffaelli (2003) and 
Cook (2009).  
11 See www.jstor.org. The search was performed on 18 March 2012.  
12 Concerns about increasing returns are divulged in Appendix H of the Principles. For discussions of Marshall’s 
treatment of time and increasing returns see Sraffa (1926), Schumpeter (1954, p. 995), Shackle (1972, pp. 244, 
286-96), Loasby (1978), Levine (1980), Currie and Steedman (1990, ch. 2), Thomas (1991), Buchanan and Yoon 
(1999). 
13 For discussions of the concepts of representative firm and representative agent see Thomas (1991), Kirman 
(1992), Hartley (1996, 1997) and Schohl (1999).  
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By contrast, in population thinking, species are described in terms of a distribution of 
characteristics. Variety and diversity are all-important: ‘There is no “typical” individual’ 
(Mayr 1982, p. 46). ‘The heart of population thinking’, Elliott Sober (1985, p. 880) writes, 
‘consists in the idea that theories may be stated relating the interactions of population 
properties and magnitudes.’ It is precisely these population and relational properties that the 
concept of the representative firm ignores. 
The ‘representative firm’ is a reductive method of obtaining a long-period equilibrium for 
the industry as a whole. But as Thomas (1991, p. 7) remarks: ‘If the “representative firm” is a 
biological concept, is it not strange that two-thirds of the references to it in the Principles are 
in Book 5 which is devoted to mechanical equilibrium analysis?’ 
But Marshall did not reduce the ‘representative firm’ to a uniform entity across an industry, 
and make it represent real firms taken severally. His Spencerian emphasis on the evolution of 
heterogeneity prohibited this. That change of meaning was accomplished later, by Arthur 
Pigou, Edward Chamberlin, Joan Robinson and others (Moss 1984, Foss 1991). Marshall’s 
concept applies to the whole industry, rather than a single firm. As a concept it looks forward 
toward evolutionary economics, and back toward the mechanistic world of equilibrium 
theory. But a mechanistic vision prevailed, even in Marshall’s own work and especially in the 
hands of later interpreters.  
It is not argued that Marshall derived his concept of the representative firm from Spencer. 
Instead, the concept can be accommodated in a Spencerian framework, but not by Darwinian 
population thinking. Hence the relatively greater influence of Spencer is manifest in this 
indirect manner.  
The difference between Spencer and Darwin is crucial. Spencer started from homogeneity 
and saw variation coming later. By contrast, Darwin saw variety as the evolutionary fuel upon 
which natural selection would operate. Darwinian population thinking rules out the idea of a 
single representative entity among a population. The greater influence of Spencer allowed 
Marshall to focus on the representative firm around which other firms are clustered, while 
acknowledging that variety was important and real. But this drew him back to equilibrium 
rather than forward to evolution.  
Chapter 8 of Book 4 of the Principles ‘reads like a blueprint of a book on economic 
biology’ (Thomas 1991, pp. 8-9). Consider some extracts from this chapter. Marshall saw an 
analogy between the subdivision of functions and organic differentiation in nature and similar 
phenomena in industry. Here the influence of Spencer is abundantly clear. For example, 
Marshall (1920, p. 240) postulates 
a fundamental unity of action between the laws of nature in the physical and in the 
moral world. This central unity is set forth in the general rule, to which there are not 
very many exceptions, that the development of the organism, whether social or physical, 
involves an increasing subdivision of functions between its separate parts on the one 
hand, and on the other a more intimate connection between them.14 
                                                 
14 Marshall then refers to the German theorists Haeckel and Schäffle, both of whom were also influenced by 
Spencer and Darwin.  
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Marshall here evokes Spencer’s central idea that evolutionary progress involves a 
combination of differentiation and integration.15 He also endorses Spencer’s idea of the unity 
of the natural and the social sciences. Marshall (1920, p. 241) repeats and illustrates the same 
notion in a subsequent paragraph: 
This increased subdivision of functions, or ‘differentiation,’ as it is called, manifests 
itself with regard to industry in such forms as the division of labour, and the 
development of specialized skill, knowledge and machinery: while ‘integration,’ that is, 
a growing intimacy and firmness of the connections between the separate parts of the 
industrial organism, shows itself in such forms as the increase of security of commercial 
credit, and of the means and habits of communication by sea and road, by railway and 
telegraph, by post and printing press. 
Marshall, here refers to ‘differentiation’ and ‘integration’ as if they were established technical 
terms. He retained them in the eighth edition of 1920. What is their origin? They are key 
concepts in Spencer’s frequently reiterated account of evolution. For example, Spencer (1890, 
p. 360) wrote 
Evolution … is a change from a less coherent form to a more coherent form … The 
entire mass is integrating, and simultaneously differentiating from other masses; and 
each member of it is also integrating and simultaneously differentiating from other 
members. … Evolution is definable as a change from an incoherent homogeneity to a 
coherent heterogeneity, accompanying the dissipation of motion and integration of 
matter. 
Marshall was eclectic and influenced by many authors, but he drew more from Spencer than 
Darwin. In every edition of his Principles, and into the era when Spencer was downgraded 
and almost forgotten, Marshall (1920, p. 243) repeatedly invoked the Lamarck-Spencer thesis 
of use and disuse: 
Herbert Spencer has insisted with much force on the rule that, if any physical or mental 
exercise gives pleasure and is therefore frequent, those physical or mental organs which 
are used in it are likely to grow rapidly.  
Marshall saw ‘use and disuse’ as an engine of variety and evolutionary development. He saw 
the principal engine of this increasing diversity and complexity as the Lamarck-Spencer 
notion of ‘development through use’.  
These Spencerian notions inspired a distinctive social ontology for Marshall’s work. 
Marshall envisioned an economic ‘organism’ made up of components with different 
functions. Instead of inert similar particles subject to forces, Marshall (1920, pp. 89, 764) saw 
individuals as active and divergent developers of their own varied wants and capacities. 
Purposeful and creative individuals led to divergence and diversity; they were not uniform 
particles subject to external forces. Although this notion of creative individuality as a source 
of diversity has multiple sources (Cook 2009), it also ties in with Spencer’s Lamarckism.  
While such an ontology may be capable of mathematical representation, it did not fit 
readily into the mathematical formalisms that other neoclassical economists had borrowed 
                                                 
15 In an otherwise excellent discussion of Marshall, Loasby (1978, p. 6) quotes the very same words as above 
from the Principles, but sees therein a connection with Adam Smith alone, failing to mention Spencer anywhere 
in his essay. This is just one example of the neglect of Spencer by leading Marshall scholars.  
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from physics. Marshall (1920, p. 461) warned of the complications and problems of 
tractability that would emerge from a more complex and evolutionary perspective:  
economic problems are imperfectly presented when they are treated as problems of statical 
equilibrium, and not of organic growth. For though the statical treatment alone can give us 
definiteness and precision of thought, and is therefore a necessary introduction to a more 
philosophic treatment of society as an organism; it is yet only an introduction. 
Note Marshall’s use of the phrase ‘organic growth’: Spencer used it several times. 
Furthermore, Spencer argued in an essay originally published in 1857 that ‘organic growth’ 
put limits on precise empirical grounding and made theoretical development more difficult. 
Spencer (1888, p. 889) wrote: ‘Legitimate deduction presupposes adequate data; and in 
respect to the special phenomena of organic growth, structure, and function, adequate data are 
unattainable, and will probably ever remain so.’ Both Spencer and Marshall saw complexity 
and ‘organic growth’ as limiting the development of precise, deductive theory.  
With his ‘evolutionary’ and ‘organic’ ideas, Marshall had unwittingly begun to undermine 
his static analysis and underlined unfolding diversity, organisation and complexity. These 
ideas seemed to play on his mind for the remainder of his life. In one place he emphasizes a 
distinction between complex evolutionary and mechanistic approaches, by reference to 
qualitative as well as to quantitative change: 
[The] catastrophes of mechanics are caused by changes in the quantity and not in the 
character of the forces at work: whereas in life their character changes also. ‘Progress’ 
or ‘evolution,’ industrial and social, is not mere increase or decrease. It is organic 
growth, chastened and confined and occasionally reversed by the decay of innumerable 
factors, each of which influences and is influenced by those around it; and every such 
mutual influence varies with the stages which the respective factors have already 
reached in their growth. In this vital respect all sciences of life are akin to one another, 
and are unlike physical sciences. And therefore in the later stages of economics, when 
we are approaching nearly to the conditions of life, biological analogies are to be 
preferred to the mechanical, other things being equal (Marshall 1898, pp. 42-3). 
Marshall again uses the term ‘organic growth’ and emphasises qualitative change. In a 1902 
letter to John Bates Clark, Marshall expressed further disillusionment with static analysis 
based on competitive equilibrium. Reflecting on the time around 1870 when he was working 
out his theory of value, he wrote: 
I then believed it was possible to have a coherent though abstract doctrine of economics 
in which competition was the only dominant force; and I then defined ‘normal’ as that 
which the undisturbed play of competition would bring about: and I now regard that 
position as untenable from an abstract as well as from a practical point of view 
(Marshall 1961, vol. 2, p. 67). 
In the preface to the eighth edition of the Principles Marshall (1920, p. xv) argued that: ‘The 
main concern of economics is thus with human beings who are impelled, for good and evil, to 
change and progress. ... The central idea of economics, even when its Foundations alone are 
under discussion, must be that of living force and movement.’ He upheld the relevance of 
biological analogies for this project.  
When Marshall published his Principles in 1890, Spencer’s work on evolution was in its 
heyday. Twenty years later it was widely abandoned (Peel 1971, Hodgson 1993a, 1993b, 
2004a). Marshall noted the shifts opinion among biologists, including the persuasive technical 
and experimental attacks by August Weismann (1889) and others on Lamarckism. Spencer 
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(1893) came out the worst in a debate with Weismann (1893). But in a letter to Benjamin 
Kidd of 6 June 1894, Marshall reported having read the Weismann-Spencer controversy but 
‘without being convinced’ by Weismann’s arguments. Marshall went on in this letter to 
declare his enduring adherence to the idea of the Lamarckian inheritance of acquired 
characters (Whitaker 1996, vol. 2, p. 114).  
Marshall repeated his qualified sentence on ‘the Mecca of the economist’ in every preface 
to the Principles from the fifth edition on. However, as Thomas (1991) and Whitaker (1990) 
show, he delayed and procrastinated over the planned second volume with its greater 
emphasis on dynamics. The growing unpopularity of Spencer’s evolutionary system after the 
1890s made the task much more difficult. As Moss (1990, p. 85) argues, the problem for 
Marshall was not a commitment to evolutionary biology in general. Instead ‘it may have been 
his stubborn commitment to a particular variant of evolutionary biology (that is, Spencer’s 
version of evolutionary biology) that blinded him’. To complete the second volume and 
accord with contemporary biological thinking, Marshall would have to find an alternative 
over-arching evolutionary theory.16  
Later Marshallians neglected the biological aspects of Marshall’s thinking, and abandoned 
any attempt to recast economics along biological or evolutionary lines. Thus, for instance, 
Pigou (1922, 1928) turned instead to physics for inspiration, and in his hands the 
representative firm became the firm in mechanical equilibrium. Equilibrium concepts were 
developed that were no longer consistent with heterogeneous economic agents (Moss 1984, 
Foss 1991).  
By the time of Marshall’s death in 1924, the dialogue between economics and biology had 
virtually ceased.17 In an article on Marshall marking the centenary of his birth, Gerald Shove 
(1942, p. 323) noted ‘a return to the mechanical as against the biological approach’ in 
mainstream economics. Despite its Marshallian pedigree, the theory of the firm in the post-
war microeconomic textbooks showed little trace of biology (Gee 1983, Newman 1960). 
Biology was virtually excluded from economics from the late 1920s until the middle of the 
century, when it began slowly and sporadically to reappear (Hodgson 1999, ch. 5; 2004a).  
5. Conclusion: Marshall and the economics of tomorrow 
We now bring the threads together and turn to the relevance of the above discussion for 
modern economics. A key hypothesis is that there is a connection between Marshall’s 
cautious use of mathematics and his Spencerian evolutionism. The notion of ever-increasing 
variation and increasing complexity in Spencerian evolution poses a challenge to many formal 
models, particularly those based on metaphors from nineteenth century physics. Marshall 
acknowledged the diversities among human agents and organisations and their continuous 
evolution through time. He believed that if they were useful at all, models had to help us 
understand the real world. And if the real world was one of unceasing flux and ever-
                                                 
16 As Whitaker (1990) argues, there were additional reasons why Marshall failed to produce the second volume, 
including his focus on applied research, his involvement in Parliamentary committees, his perfectionist 
hesitation, and eventually his declining health.  
17 It lived on for a few more years in the United States, partly through the influence of Veblen. But by the 1930s 
even most of Veblen’s followers had abandoned his biologically-inspired evolutionary research programme 
(Rutherford 1998, Hodgson 2004a). 
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increasing diversity, then the simpler models of his time would always be limited in their 
capacities to address this reality.  
But the issue is more complex. Other authors might accept the varied and changing nature 
of reality but react in a different way, by arguing that this variety and complexity rule out the 
use of mathematics which abstracts from or limits these features. For example, Tony Lawson 
(1997) argues that socio-economic reality is generally complex and evolving. The researcher 
faces the challenges of dealing with open systems within which agents have radical 
uncertainty about the future. Given this ontology, he claims that mathematics is generally 
unsuited, because it involves closed systems and excludes uncertainty.  
But if this argument were true, it would apply to other sciences dealing with complex and 
evolving phenomena, particularly biology. Yet biology exhibits several important and 
successful examples of mathematical analysis. Implicit in Lawson’s argument is that 
mathematical models should sufficiently resemble in key respects to the ontological features 
that they address. But in biology and elsewhere models involve a high degree of abstraction 
and number of simplifying assumptions that conflict with reality itself – and there is no reason 
that they must necessarily fail because of this limitation. Any claim that models always should 
try to mirror essential features of reality is unwarranted.  
Furthermore, Lawson’s argument is based on an over-emphasis on the use of models for 
prediction. As I have argued more fully elsewhere (Hodgson 2006, ch. 7), he belittles the 
alternative role of models as explanatory heuristics. The primary role of heuristics is not to 
predict. Their purpose is to identify possible causal mechanisms that form part of a more 
complex (and inevitably open) system. Heuristics can be useful without necessarily making 
adequate predictions or matching existing data. Their purpose is to establish a plausible 
segment of a whole causal story, without necessarily giving an adequate or complete 
explanation of the phenomena to which they relate. As noted above, Marshall explained that 
he used mathematics to clarify and check his conceptual reasoning. This deployment of 
formal methods is a version of heuristic usage.  
Consider another possible reaction to the hypothesis in the first paragraph of this section. A 
neoclassical economist might react to Marshall’s observations concerning complexity and 
evolution and freely admit their presence the real world. The neoclassical economist would 
then point out that all science necessarily involves abstraction, isolation and simplification. 
This point would have to be conceded by a Marshallian (or Lawsonian) opponent. Science 
unavoidably proceeds in such a manner.  
But the next neoclassical step would be to use the paradigm and organising metaphor of 
mechanics to make particular simplifying assumptions. Assumed away would be diversity 
among individuals and perhaps even their changing preferences. Particles would replace 
living agents. The focus would be on equilibrium rather than evolution. Increasing returns 
would be relegated in importance or removed from the models, and so on.  
The claim here is that the over-arching metaphors and meta-theories help determine the 
particular simplifications and abstractions that are chosen in a model. They also help 
determine a kind of implicit prioritisation, for which assumptions or simplifications are the 
most temporary of expedients and would be the first to be removed.  
Because his meta-theory was largely Spencerian, Marshall felt uneasy with any reduction to 
mechanics that assumed away the inbuilt generation of variety at the individual level. He 
often relapsed into equilibrium analysis. But he was always keen to transcend statics and 
move to dynamics, as that corresponded to the fuller version of his Spencerian vision.  
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If this argument is correct, then it accounts for Marshall’s exceptional qualms concerning 
the use of mathematics, compared with other neoclassical economists. Their different attitudes 
to formalism stem from a clear difference of metaphor and meta-theory.  
What are the implications of this for the economics of tomorrow? We now know that 
Spencerian evolutionary theory is flawed and inadequate. Darwinism has been in the 
ascendant. More than a century ago, Veblen (1900, p. 265) wrote:  
Professor Marshall shows an aspiration to treat economic life as a development; and, at 
least superficially, much of his work bears the appearance of being a discussion of this 
kind. ... His insistence on the continuity of development and of the economic structure 
of communities is a characteristic of the best work along the later line of classical 
political economy. All this gives an air of evolutionism to the work.  
Veblen argued that economics should absorb the full impact of the Darwinian revolution in 
science. Veblen (1908, pp. 399-400) called for a ‘post-Darwinian science’ with 
a new distribution of emphasis, whereby the process of causation, the interval of 
instability and transition between initial cause and definitive effect, has come to take the 
first place in the inquiry; instead of that consummation in which causal effect was once 
presumed to come to rest. 
In other words, teleological reasoning had to be replaced by a Darwinian approach, with 
algorithmic, cause-and-effect analysis. Veblen rightly recognised the revolutionary 
implications of Darwinism for science in general and economics in particular. Much later the 
biologist Ernst Mayr (1964, p. xviii) wrote: ‘It has taken 100 years to appreciate fully that 
Darwin’s conceptual framework is, indeed, a new philosophical system.’  
While Spencer inspired a distinctive social ontology for Marshall’s work, which different 
radically from that of other neoclassical economists by emphasising the development of 
individual diversity, Spenerian evolutionary principles were inadequate for Marshall’s project. 
It is now realised that Darwinian principles can overcome these limitations and be generalised 
to the social domain. 
Much of modern evolutionary economics takes its cue from Richard Nelson and Sidney 
Winter’s (1982) classic book. They employed Darwin’s principles of variation, selection and 
retention (or replication) but dared not call them Darwinian. (They have subsequently 
rectified this omission.)  
It took over twenty years for Darwinian principles to be generalised in a form that was 
suitable for economics and other social sciences (Hull 1988, Aldrich et al. 2008, Stoelhorst 
2008, Hodgson and Knudsen 2010). If the ‘Mecca of the economist’ (Marshall 1920, p. xiv) 
still lies in economic biology, then modern generalised versions of Darwinian principles must 
be considered as possible meta-theoretical frameworks. Only time and much further work will 
tell if a Darwinian meta-theory can serve as a basis for a new mode of economic theorising.  
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